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"Corporate Governance is best understood in the context of the broader institutional environment."

Corporate governance is best understood in the context of the broader institutional environment. 

The effects of corporate regulation vary depending on the institutional environment; where certain regulatory mechanisms effectively address governance concerns in one type of environment, the same mechanisms may be less relevant or ineffective in other circumstances. The quality of courts and agencies or the structure of corporate ownership can be relevant factors in this regard. It can be disingenuous, for example, to expect minority shareholder interests to be enforced through the courts, if the legal system is not geared to deal with corporate matters or if the risks related to legal action are significant.


Regulatory intervention is the outcome of political processes, where the ability of corporate constituencies to coordinate their interests varies. Regulatory outcomes can be expected to reflect the best interests of politically dominant constituencies - but are also affected by the institutional structure of the political processes. In the EU context, the agenda-setting powers of the Commission and the evolving political dynamic among EU institutions provide topical areas of research in this regard.

Corporate governance and other corporate regulation are highly significant for the competitiveness of corporate enterprise. It is therefore important to understand the dynamics of corporate governance, regulation and politics so that legal strategies are better tailored to the institutional environment.


The relationships among corporate constituencies are highly significant as regards control of corporate assets and profits; the legal, economic and political aspects of these relationships  all contribute to  corporate governance.


Corporate governance and securities laws are highly interconnected as regards  publicly listed corporations. In this sense, financial regulation forms an avenue for intervention in corporate governance relationships, and the market for regulation can be used as a yardstick for assessing the relative bargaining power of corporate constituencies.



Regulation in general provides an avenue for corporate constituencies to bargain about corporate control and corporate profits. The political economy defines the framework for feasible governance solutions, while the broader political environment introduces further interest groups with a stake in corporate governance.



This website serves as a platform for a research project on the relationships between corporate regulation, market structures and politics. The research is focused on EU corporate governance regulation, concentrated ownership, state ownership and Nordic corporate governance.  

Klaus Ilmonen is a partner and attorney practicing corporate and securities law with a focus on takeovers and cross-border capital markets transactions. He is serving as a professor of practice at the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki. He has advised the EU securities markets authority ESMA on EU corporate finance regulation. He has participated in drafting national takeover regulation and teaches corporate and securities law at Hanken and at the University of Helsinki.

He has also served with Finnish forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon and written on international military intervention. The adjoining picture is of the Hindu Kush mountain range.

2019 -                     Professor of Practice, Hanken Sch. of Econ.

​2016                       Doctor of Laws, University of Helsinki

2011 - 2012 (Jan.) Visiting researcher, Harvard Law School

1999                       LL.M., Columbia University (Stone Scholar)


University Address:

The Hanken School of Economics - 

Hanken Svenska Handelshögskolan

Runebergsgatan 22

00100 Helsingfors, Finland

Business Address:

Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd.

Södra esplanaden 20,

00130 Helsingfors, Finland

Tel: +358 9 228841

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