DISPATCHES* - "The Hundred Days"

The Hundred Days – Perspectives From the Levant

The first hundred days of a new US administration is when it is expected to leave its mark in US policy[1]. News media and political analysts follow the events of the first hundred days with particular focus to see how the new administration lays its groundwork. The current US administration took over in Washington DC in early 2025 and its hundred-day mark comes up in the end of April. The new administration has certainly been busy; executive orders and new policies have followed each other with much controversy and protest. So far it is very unclear whether any good has come from this.

Altogether, a hundred days may be a short time to pursue new legislation in the partisan political environment in the United States with entrenched interests and empowered lobbies – but it is a lifetime in the volatile environment of Middle East politics. In fact, in relation to the Middle East, it is more relevant to review the hundred days before a new administration enters office. In connection with US presidential elections everything that happens in the Middle East is linked to developments in the United States. Policies of the United States have significant implications to the dynamics of politics in the Middle East – as it does in many other regions. It is no coincidence, of course, that the Gaza ceasefire agreement was reached only a day before the January inauguration of President Trump. But political developments in Lebanon, the appointment of a new president and prime minister, as well as, possibly, the timing of the initiative to overthrow the Syria regime, were all related to the change in the US administration as well.

Uncertainty Regarding Policy

There is always an element of uncertainty with regard to the priorities of a new US administration. Even if they have made foreign policy statements or have a prior foreign policy history, there is uncertainty with respect to their policy priorities once in office. Domestic issues may require considerable attention from a new administration, or they may prioritize other regions of interest. US foreign policy is facing challenges from regions far from the Middle East – the US “pivot to the Pacific” is not only rhetoric, but a concise summary of shifts in geopolitical power struggles. Moreover, with developments in the energy sector, the strategic importance of the Middle East has decreased somewhat – though one may be ill-advised to underestimate the capacity of the region as a source of international strife.

It is this uncertainty that drives regional political actors to secure their flanks or to sharpen their swords prior to a change in the US administration. They will start pushing their agendas – by lobbying, diplomacy, financially and by military force – as soon as they can and continue until they have figured out the priorities or agenda of the new US administration. Political volatility and escalations can be expected at any time there is a potential change in US foreign policy and priorities.

Opportunistic Positioning

Regional political actors in the Middle East will take advantage of US election politics. It has been said that domestic issues decide US presidential elections, but foreign policy dominates presidential legacies. Before the US elections, regional actors can seek to take advantage of the political pressures on US presidential candidates who need to maximize their political support and cannot afford to alienate important domestic constituencies. As candidates seek to ensure support in key battleground states, they will look for homogenous constituencies that could deliver the state. It was no surprise, then, that the Israeli government pursued a robust military campaign in Gaza and Lebanon during the months leading to the US election date. Overtly harsh criticism of Israel would not have helped either candidate in their efforts to gain the support of important domestic constituencies. The efforts of the democratic candidate to balance her bets were telling in her statements to support Israel and at the same time emphasising the rights of Palestinians and their humanitarian suffering.[2]

The Lame Duck Presidency

The outgoing US administration can be expected to actively look to entrench its policies and take steps to frustrate efforts by the new administration to change them – to the extent it can. Funding can be provided earlier than otherwise would have been the case, for example, to the extent the administration can do so. The Biden administration tried to do that with respect to US support for Ukraine, releasing as much military aid as possible under existing and available authorizations that did not require congressional approval.

The Gaza ceasefire, on the other hand, provides an example where the old and new administrations looked to cooperate – possibly for different reasons. The Biden administration had been working on a mediated solution to the situation, but it appeared to have been Trump’s intervention and pressure that brought about the parties to accept the ceasefire. The Biden administration had the relevant contacts and history, while the new administration had made it clear that it was not worthwhile to wait until the new administration took office – i.e. that a change in policy with regard to that specific question was not to be expected. It is possible that the new administration wanted to pursue other priorities once in office – and the situation on the ground had largely already been settled by military means to the extent this was possible. The rest would require diplomatic means in any case.

Positions of Strength

An important goal for regional political actors in connection with a change of the US administration is to establish a position of strength before the new administration takes office. To the extent possible, regional actors will make a push – with more risks than otherwise - to achieve tactical or strategic political or military goals immediately prior to the new administration taking office to maximize negotiating positions or to lock-in any achievements if those are not expected to be supported by the new administration, for example. Thus, during the final months before a new administration enters office in the US, one can expect more aggressive military campaigns in troubled regions than otherwise. The year-end of the 2024 and early 2025 did not disappoint in this regard.

Hindering the New Administration

Regional political actors can also be expected to use different means to prevent the new administration from pursuing policies that could be detrimental for regional actors. They may seek to create distractions for the new administration, for example, or look to leverage any political vulnerabilities the new administration has. They may seek to partner with US opposition to attack the efforts of the administration, for example, creating domestic political pressures that distract the administration from its foreign policy goals.

The Waiting Game

In some situations, regional actors will deliberately stall to wait for a new US administration to take office to have better freedom of manoeuvring. A classic example is when Iran decided to free US hostages immediately upon Ronald Reagan having taken office – at the request of his administration, it is believed.[3]  Russia has of course been waiting for the Trump administration to take office with the expectation that policies regarding Ukraine will change, as Trump had indicated. Russia has not been in much of a hurry to make strategic gains on the battlefield; they do not necessarily need to achieve a particular strategic or tactical advantage but can play a longer game. They have analysed the goals of the new administration and will of course seek to maximize any leverage they have in that regard, including their position in the politics of the Middle East, for example.

Closed Doors, Open Windows

A change of administration can close doors on foreign policy initiatives. When Trump first took office in 2017, the process with Iran to deter its development of nuclear weapons was abandoned (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or “JCPOA”). The participant European nations were not able to maintain the process as tensions again increased between Iran and the United States, including military attacks on both Iranian forces and on US bases in Iraq. The Trump administration ultimately targeted and killed the leader of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in 2020. When the Biden administration entered office in 2021, there were expectations for a less confrontational policy – even for revisiting some variation of the JCPOA.[4] However, this also required an open window on Iran’s side, where views vary as regards its nuclear ambitions and its international engagements broader. This was demonstrated in the Iranian presidential elections in the summer of 2021, where more tempered leaders ultimately lost resulting in the JCPOA not having made much progress since.

Geopolitical Shifts and Middle East Policy

The Middle East has traditionally been extremely important for the United States. However, US interests in the region appear less existential than earlier with the end of the Cold War, changes in US dependency on Middle East oil and in geopolitical shifts towards the Pacific. The Middle East is less the scene for proxy wars between global powers and more the scene of regional conflicts, albeit with very some very dangerous elements.

As the strategic importance of the Middle East has decreased somewhat, political leaders of the region can no longer look with the same confidence to their patrons for strategic support and need to agree to new terms and conditions for international support for their agendas; they have to find compromises and even new alliances. The Abraham-accords negotiated under the Trump administration could be seen in this context, for example. The Arab-states involved in the accords were reacting to new emerging threats whereas their conflicts with Israel had become of a second order.

The shift of focus towards the Pacific entails some risks as regards the Middle East situation.  Political volatility may increase in the region as geopolitical priorities slowly shift elsewhere. The possibility of political actors misinterpreting the overall situation grows. Political actors with interests in the region are likely to aggressively push forward their own agendas to fill any void in influence and power that has been created by any theoretical decrease of US dominance or presence in the region. In this game, someone may look to opportunistically take advantage of the United States prioritizing other fronts and overreach – triggering a US and international response.

The Next Hundred Days

Think-tanks are full of capable Middle East-analysts who are following the Trump administration’s policies in the region. Dramatic turns of events can be expected. Nevertheless, the next hundred days that are likely to count most, will start in the late fall of 2028.

The DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONTLINES OF PEACE provide brief commentary based on experiences and observations from past deployments in regions in crisis.

[1] The Economist, ”Why an American president’s first 100 days matter”, 24.1.2021, available at https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/01/24/why-an-american-presidents-first-100-days-matter.

[2] Jaclyn Diaz, Harris says Israel 'has right to defend itself,' Palestinians need 'dignity, security', NPR 23 August 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/08/23/g-s1-19232/kamala-harris-israel-gaza-dnc

[3] Peter Baker, A Four-Decade Secret: One Man’s Story of Sabotaging Carter’s Re-election, 18 March 2023.

[4] Paul K. Kerr, Jennifer K. Elsea and Clayton Thomas, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service, 29 January 2021.